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Customer Rating: 
Summary: Kicking Down Institutional Walls
Comment: By: Jeffrey W. Bennett, ISP, Author of: ISP Certification-The Industrial Security Professional Exam Manual and Under the Lontar Palm
This book commands attention! The authors bring to light current security practices, methods and decision analysis and their many shortcomings. The authors' thesis; to provide sound argument toward a more modern and effective way of implementing security practices. The ideas are easy to apply, but contrary to what is taught by security seminars and vendors selling security products.
While security seminars and education efforts teach cataclysmic results of security breaches, "New School" demonstrates the need for collecting data to assess the threat in a scientific manner. Shostack and Stewart champion going back to raw data to identify the threats and then develop programs to address those threats.
Aside from evidence related to loss, espionage or other threats, risk managers cannot effectively apply security measures. The authors indicate that breech data exists, but the holders are reluctant to share. However, the authors do a good job of proving that companies who publically admitted failure recovered quickly from any scandal or fallout from information or data breeches.
The authors know down the traditional walls of security training institutions. They preach good solid evidence behind decision making; otherwise security managers can not effectively determine whether or not the lack of threat is a result of new security measures or just plain luck.
The book is easy to read implement in all areas of security. The physical security, loss prevention, DoD contractor, and many others in and out of the security profession can adapt the principles to their business units.
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Summary: Recommended reading for information security practitioners
Comment: As an information security professional, I enjoyed reading this book. The authors present a somewhat compelling case for a scientific approach to information security that emphasizes decision making based on empirical evidence, public disclosure of breach data as a means of gathering that evidence, and the application of methods and concepts from other disciplines such as economics, psychology, and sociology to information security problems.
In the first part of the book, the authors attempt to make the case that information security as a discipline is failing. High profile examples of various forms of computer crime, spam, phishing, malware, data breaches, and identity theft are cited as evidence. While the material makes for interesting reading, it falls somewhat short of making a convincing argument that the bad guys are winning the war on all fronts. I would have liked to see more solid evidence that the current approaches are not working. Has anti-virus technology truly failed to stem the tide of malware? Are there any statistics on that? What about anti-spam measures? Surely, not everything that the security industry has been up to until now has been a waste of time?
The current state of the security industry is examined next. Some criticism of the security industry is certainly warranted. The proliferation of questionable products which are more marketing hype than substance is a phenomenon that has parallels in other domains as well. One need only look at the world of high-end audio, where ridiculously expensive snake-oil products are sold to eager buyers who convince themselves that they can hear the difference in sound quality that these products purportedly afford them. However, this observation does not justify the wholesale rejection of all security products on the market and the security practices they facilitate. Just as technology alone cannot solve most real-world security problems, neither can most security failures be blamed on technology alone.
Several potential sources of empirical data are evaluated in the third and fourth chapter. Surveys are largely dismissed as flawed. The value of data from trade publications is questioned due to issues of timeliness and relevance to individual organizations. Software vulnerability data is given a little more respect, although the challenge to drawing meaningful conclusions from it remains largely unsolved. Instrumentation on the Internet in the form of honeypots and other security sensors is described as a promising source of evidence. In a similar vein, breach data locked up within the confines of individual organizations would constitute a veritable goldmine if shared freely, and this is expanded upon in the following chapter. The authors conclude with the observation that while objective evidence is very difficult to come by, the search for it must become the central focus for the "new school".
The fifth chapter is an interesting illustration of the explanatory power that a multi-disciplinary approach can bring to the problems of information security. Economic theory is used to elucidate the reasons for the proliferation of insecure software, the resistance to adoption of many security technologies and the failure to stop spam. Concepts from psychology are applied to the problems of patching software vulnerabilities and the management of security risks. The sociological problem of gender bias and lack of ethnic diversity within the computer security community is explored in terms of its exclusionary effect on new insights and fresh ways of thinking about information security.
Information security spending is analyzed in chapter six. Several emerging business drivers, such as creating customer trust and the benefits of security capabilities on IT operations efficiency, are described and may be of interest to readers faced with the challenge of selling security within their own organizations. Traditional approaches to security spending are discussed and sometimes rightfully criticized. An interesting recommendation is made: based on a study by Gordon and Loeb at the University of Maryland, the optimal amount to spend on the protection of an asset is 37% of the expected loss. Psychological factors influencing spending decisions are examined. The cost-effectiveness of employee security awareness and training is questioned, as is the return on investment from the development of a comprehensive security policy framework. This chapter is likely to be the most controversial one in the eyes of many security practitioners who are not technologists.
If I have been somewhat skeptical of the early parts of the book, I wholeheartedly agree with the overall message in the final two chapters. It is certainly worthwhile to explore new directions in information security, and a scientific, multi-disciplinary approach holds much promise for the future. The "new school" mind-set can only be a positive influence on the industry and I would not hesitate to recommend this book to anyone in the information security profession.
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Summary: New School better than Old School
Comment: I think Adam and Andrew did some good work on the book. I just finished The New School of Information Security the other day. I was happy to recognize the names of a couple of the reviewers, and I could picture them making some of the comments when a 'reviewer' was referred to in the text. I think the book will be an eye-opener for a lot of folks in the professional world. I think I am somewhat lucky in the fact that most systems administrators and security people I know already think in the "New School". I think this is perhaps due to the fact most of us are in Academia.
Also, I liked the style of End Notes. This is the first book in a very long time that I have actually read through the end notes instead of just referring back to them at some other point. Also, the lack of in-text citation really did help the book flow smoothly.
Although not all this information may be new to everyone, I think a lot of people could benefit from this book. If anything, it will provide those in the industry with the view of how we in academia tend to view things. The book was written in a very easy to read manner and flowed rather well. I don't think anyone would have a problem chewing through this book in 3 or 4 days given the time, and those 3 or 4 days are completely worth it.
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Summary: A Must-Read Book on a Proper IT Outlook
Comment: The New School's thesis is straightforward: publish data and use that data to approach IT security questions with a more scientific mindset, utilizing other academic disciplines such as economics and psychology to aid in solving problems.
The book would be a great primer for an MBA course on IT systems and organizational behavior. I suspect that so much of what causes secrecy around breaches in business organizations are the overblown fears of MBAs of customers fleeing. Shostack and Stewart do a good job calming those fears, and showing how disclosure really helps all parties move toward better security.
The book is a quick read, and it's more of a philosophical treatise than a how-to manual. For that reason I think it would be beneficial for anyone in IT or an organization's management to read it, as the book speaks to both parties.
I should disclose that I've known Adam Shostack for years, I do not know Andrew Stewart.
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Summary: Amateurs Study Cryptography; Professionals Study Economics
Comment: What a delightful chapter title in Adam Shostack's and Andrew Stewart's new book, The New School of Information Security. They have produced a readable, compact tour of the information security field as it stands today - or perhaps as it lies in its crib. What we know intuitively the authors bring forward thoughtfully in their analysis of the information security industry: it is struggling to keep up with the defects in online communication, data storage, and business processes.
Shostack and Stewart helpfully review the stable of plagues on computing, communication, and remote commerce: spam, phishing, viruses, identity theft, and such. Likewise, they introduce the cast of characters in the security field, all of whom seem to be feeling along in the dark together.
Why are the lights off? Lack of data, they argue. Most information security decisions are taken in the absence of good information. The authors perceptively describe the substitutes for good information, like following trends, clinging to established brands, or chasing after studies produced by or for security vendors.
The authors revel in the breach data that has been made available to them thanks to disclosure laws like California's SB 1386. A purist must quibble with mandated disclosure when common law can drive consumer protection more elegantly. But good data is good data, and the happenstance of its availability in the breach area is welcome.
In the most delightful chapter in the book (I've used it as the title of this review), Shostack and Stewart go through the some of the most interesting problems in information security. Technical problems are what they are. Economics, sociology, psychology, and the like are the disciplines that will actually frame the solutions for information security problems.
In subsequent chapters, Shostack and Stewart examine security spending and advocate for the "New School" approach to security. I would summarize theirs as a call for rigor, which is lacking today. It's ironic that the world of information lacks for data about its own workings, and thus lacks sound decision-making methods, but there you go.
The book is a little heavy on "New School" talk. If the name doesn't stick, Shostack and Stewart risk looking like they failed to start a trend. But it's a trend that must take hold if information security is going to be a sound discipline and industry. I'm better aware for reading The New School of Information Security that info sec is very much in its infancy. The nurturing Shostack and Stewart recommend will help it grow.
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