It's disturbing/enlightening to learn how complicated it is to engineer a secure system (or how easy they are to break) after Anderson explains the technology behind them.

The author is nothing short of brilliant. He covers a great variety of security issues, from smart cards, power monitoring, cryptography, passwords, access control, EMF emission monitoring [Tempest], biometrics, banking security, the history of all the previous topics, etc., etc., etc..

The other impressive qualities of this book are its clear and amusing writing style, excellent references, and tieing all this together in a fashion that provides a cohesive strategy for implementing truly secure systems.

While this book purports not to be for hackers, they will doubtlessly find this book of immense interest as well, as it covers information that I have not seen addressed in any other book that I have come across. You will learn more from reading this book than reading three years worth of 2600 Magazine.

All in all, great reading, intensely valuable information, and more fun than a barrel of monkeys.

When it comes to information security, its current state is similar to that of a Microsoft airplane--built, but often flashy, while not forcefully functional. The root of the problem is that most organizations view security as something added on in a piecemeal fashion, rather than an integral engineering issue.

Those in the construction business get this concept; they know that designs, plans, permits, coordination, commitment, buy-in, etc.,; are all requirements, not options. Similarly, before any information security product is rolled-out, the appropriate project plans must exist. While the concept that design must come before implementation is a given in most other industries, many IT departments lack this understanding.

Thus is the quandary that Ross Anderson deals with in Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems. In a nutshell, Security Engineering is one of the best security books ever written. If you are looking for 50 pages of screen prints on how to install and configure a printer under Windows 2000, this is the wrong book for that. What Anderson does, in great detail and with lucidity, is particularize all of the aspects that are required to create a security infrastructure. He relentlessly reiterates that security must be engineered into information systems from the outset. When security is retrofitted into an application or system, it is never as effective.

Anderson defines security engineering as "building systems to remain dependable in the face of malice, error or mischance. As a discipline, it focuses on the tools, processes and methods needed to design, implement and test complete systems, and to adapt existing systems as their environment evolves."

In its 24 chapters, the book covers every domain of computer security. As noted security guru Bruce Schneier writes in the book's foreword "If you're even thinking of doing any security engineering, you need to read this book." Schneier's comment compliments his own attitude that security is not a product, rather a process. Going with that mantra, Anderson demonstrates in exhaustive detail how information security must be implemented in every aspect of the information system's infrastructure in order for systems to be dependable and secure.

The often knee-jerk response to information security is to deal with it at the product level. With that, the security product of the year is purchased (Air Gap, IDS, PKI, etc.) and the company hopes and prays for security. Unfortunately, it does not work like that. Anderson writes that security products can't operate in a vacuum. They must operate in the framework of a comprehensive architecture supported by policies. That is precisely why there are huge amounts of books on security component technology, but very few on how to use them effectively. When it comes to making all of these security technologies interoperate, there are few good titles in print, and that is the value of this book....

In more than 600 pages of intense information, Anderson lays the groundwork on how to build a secure and dependable system. Every aspect of information security is discussed in the book -- from passwords, access control, and attacks, to physical security and policy. Additionally, relevant and timely topics such as information warfare, privacy protection, access control, and more are discussed. This is the only book that covers the end-to-end spectrum of security design and engineering.

Just as important as the technical issues covered in the book, the entire range of attacks that distributed systems can face (technical, procedural, and physical) are also covered. Understanding these threats are paramount in order to properly secure the system. Anderson notes from years of personal experience that many security systems are designed solely to keep the good guys out without thinking of the bad guys. There are two mistakes with this approach -- it only solves a smart part of the problem, and more importantly, the bad guys do not follow the rules. Bruce Schneier likens this approach to security as putting a pole in front of your house and hoping the attacker runs into the pole. The reality is that the adversary will simply go around the pole.

While many of the chapter topics may sound unexciting, Anderson has a wonderful writing style and at times reads almost like a Tom Clancy thriller with its details of military command and control systems and other similar topics. Anyone responsible for information security should read Security Engineering.

The way Ross Anderson goes about this task is systematic and pedagogical. He has obviously been lecturing for many years and is both an excellent presenter and a person demonstrating a good understanding of learning curves. Both the book as a whole and the individual chapters have been constructed in such a way that the reader can give up at various points of complexity without losing the plot altogether and simply start at the beginning of the following chapter for a less deep education than if he read and understood everything but nevertheless gaining a comprehensive feel for the nature of security and how to tackle its implementation. This design also enables the book to be used either as a textbook or as a reference work. Very smart - many technical authors could learn something from observing how Ross goes about it.

I also like that each chapter ends with a discussion of possible research projects, literature recommendations and of course a summary. The only irritating thing is that there are too many stupid typos such as missing words, things which another read-through by the editor should have caught. An example: `...using the key in Figure 5.7, it enciphers to TB while rf enciphers to OB...' should be `...using the key in Figure 5.7, rd enciphers to TB while rf enciphers to OB...' It is fine to use typographic tricks for illustrative purposes but you must make sure they make it into print if you do. I'm certain many readers will find the chapter on cryptography difficult enough without errors. Well, next edition...

The book consists of three parts. The first is a quite basic intro to security concepts, protocols, human-to-computer interfaces, access control, cryptography and distributed systems. I think that perhaps Ross gets a little bit carried away in Chapter 5 on crypt - I mean, why is a proof for Fermat's little theorem included? There are no other mathematical proofs anywhere. I also think that parts of this chapter could benefit from added verbosity or perhaps a few more illustrations. Whereas in this context it is not so important how crypt primitives function internally it is of course very important how they behave as system components. Just a suggestion - no real criticism.

In the second part of the book the author ingeniously uses a whole range of well-known systems incorporating security to illustrate both analytical methods and security engineering fundamentals. Using this pedagogical method, moving from the concrete and well-known to the abstract and general is good engineering practice. Almost every main section contains a subsection called What Goes Wrong in which the author analyses and presents architectural and design weaknesses in everything from ATMs to nuclear systems. I find this approach incredibly valuable, not only because it teaches good engineering methodology but also because it gives the author an opportunity to present a huge number of security problems at the implementation level in a context, from which they can be lifted, cross-referenced and placed in different contexts. This method, combined with the informed and intelligent analysis is what makes this book such a brilliant generator of understanding of security, the broad and full concept.

Also in this part of the book there is a clear line which is not only technological but which serves to place security concepts in organisational frameworks, another very strong point in favour of this work. This leads to the third part of the book, which in the words of the author deals with politics, management and assurance. Very good entertainment as well. The book ends with one of the best bibliographies that I have ever seen in the field.

Kudos to Ross Anderson for writing such a fantastic book - highly recommended reading!

Two elements combine make this book unique: first, the book manages to cover all of the major topics in the field, and second, the book covers the whole range of attacks that systems can face: technical, procedural and physical. Historically, writers on information security have focused on computers and disembodied "users," downplaying the crucial issues of physical security, perimeters, operating procedures, and the limits of human behavior. This book tries to integrate such concerns into information security thinking, instead of treating them as "special concerns that computer geeks don't really care about."

Best of all, the book is a great read. Ross has a fine way of drawing out the irony we encounter in user behavior, enterprise behavior, and even in the actions of presumed authorities in industry and government. At one point he discusses a government endorsed security evaluation process "which, as mentioned, is sufficient to keep out all attackers but the competent ones."

Ross unabashedly explains several aspects of information security that most writers ignore entirely, like security printing, seals, tamper resistance, and associated procedures. In my own books, reviewers have chided me for including such "irrelevant" topics, even though they play an essential part in making a real system work. As Ross ably points out, most successful attacks these days are pretty mundane and don't involve cryptanalysis or sophisticated protocol hacking. ATM fraud, for example, often relies on pre-computer technology like binoculars to pick up a victim's PIN. This book should open a lot of peoples' eyes.